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Embodiment and enculturation: the
future of architectural design
Harry F. Mallgrave*
College of Architecture, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL, USA
A half-century ago the Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck encouraged designers to think
about “space and time” not as abstractions in themselves but rather as cultural events
better approached through the medium of “place and occasion.” Van Eyck made this
point on the basis of his own travels and through his extensive readings in cultural
anthropology, and his prescience is only now acquiring the credibility that it deserves
through the work of a multitude of interdisciplinary researchers. Phenomenologists
argue that we are embodied organisms-acting-within-environments, and these inhabiting
abodes are constructed of both material and cultural dimensions. We are thus
preeminently social in our range of self-consciousness, and intensely ceremonial in every
facet of our being. Evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists are currently locating
the origin and development of our most basic social behaviors far in our pre-human
past; neuroscientists are today modeling our social circuits in the deepest reaches of our
brains. Architecture would gain much from an updated cultural theory grounded in these
new models of human existence.
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In two semesters of the 1979 and 1980 academic years I had the good fortune to work as a
teaching assistant to the Dutch architect Aldo van Eyck, a visiting professor at the University
of Pennsylvania. I assisted him in the design studio and also accompanied him on a number of
his outside talks. He was at that time a harsh critic of the historicist and formalist tendencies of
the incipient postmodern movement, which he countered with a strong dose of anthropological
fervor—encouraging architects not to think of design in such abstract terms as space and time, but
rather in more social or humanistic terms as “place” and “occasion” (Van Eyck, 1976). His position,
which he reiterated throughout the 1970s, was how deeply rooted in our humanity is our need
for social and communal aesthetic expression and how an understanding of human culture should
inform our design imaginations.
Van Eyck’s advice, however, was spoken into the winds of a gathering post-structural storm,
in which a widespread “incredulity toward metanarratives,” cultural or otherwise, was sweeping
away the humanist footings of the past. By the end of the 1980s architectural theory was wavering
between the decentered abstractions of deconstruction on the one hand and the new formalism that
software-based technologies on the other. Now precluded from making any cultural statements,
many designers surrendered their sketch pencils to the parametric logic of the machine. In a flurry
of polemical writings a new age was proclaimed, and in the two decades since the fall of this
postmodern semiotic, architectural theory has still not recovered its footing. In fact in many areas
of practice today one canmake the case that theory has ceased to exist altogether. Let me begin then
by posing a very basic question: Can architectural theory ever again reconcile itself with the idea of
cultural theory?
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Cultural Theory Yesterday and Today
Over the last half-century cultural theory has in itself also
undergone a radical transformation. The “social facts” of
Durkheim, or the efforts of Weber to align ethical viewpoints
with economic systems (strategies that remained cogent well into
the 1960s), have today lost their viability. The thicker cultural
webs of symbolic anthropology—Geertz’s definition of culture as
“extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms”—have too
lost much of their fascination (Geertz, 1973). The underlying
premise to all such systems was that while humans may have
been born into the world as biological organisms, their (blank
slate) characters and behaviors were largely shaped by cultural
forces.
Such views are rarely proffered today, and the most important
reason for their decline has been the remarkable advances
within the biological sciences over the last few decades.
Yesterday’s debates over “nature vs. nurture” have given way to
coevolutionary and enactive models in which genes and culture
can no longer be considered in isolation. The sequencing of DNA
alone allows us to read our evolutionary history in a way that
no speculative or archaeological approach in the past could ever
have imagined. One realm of biological theory known as niche
construction postulates that just as we alter our physical and
cultural environments, so do these changed environments alter
the genetic structures and behavioral patterns of who we are.
Architects, the designers of our built environments, should be
taking notes.
As the formerly discrete social sciences were themselves
becoming enhanced through interdisciplinary research, progress
was being made along a number of related fronts. Only a few
decades ago it was the consensus of many paleoanthropologists
that Homo sapiens underwent a major cognitive breakthrough
around 50,000 years ago, resulting in such things as cave
paintings, complex language, and other symbolic forms of
cultural transmission. Today we take a much longer view of our
ancestry and with good reason. For if we broaden our lineage out
to several million years and study the patterns of human behavior,
we gain a quite different perspective of who we are today.
Those footprints of “Lucy” (Australopithecus afarensis)
recorded in the volcanic ash of Tanzania 3.6 million years
ago already depict a semi-erect primate who had moved away
from the tropical forests of our great-ape cousins and began
to forage in the savannahs of East Africa. With the appearance
of Homo erectus around two million years ago, we have a fully
bipedal species with a physical stature and body proportions
similar to our own. He eventually learned to construct his
housing and organize his village environment (Mania andMania,
2005). Moreover, his social behavior was strikingly different from
earlier species. Not only did he have a substantially larger brain
than pre-Homo species but he hunted in larger groups over
much greater distances of time and space, which demanded
communication and coordination skills much beyond those of
apes. In making the transition to the use of fire and cooked foods,
he may well have practiced imitation, laughter, and other aspects
of what Merlin Donald has called mimetic culture (Donald,
2001).
If we turn to Homo heidelbergensis, who emerged in Africa
sometime after 800,000 years ago, we find a species with behaviors
similar to our own. Again their group activities and social
communities expanded in size and range, while anatomical
changes in the vocal cord and ear canals announce the rudiments
of speech. With the widespread use of communal hearths around
500,000 years ago, it is likely that we have the cultural appearance
of music, song, and dance—domains formerly considered to be
the exclusive purview of humans. Both the Neanderthals and
modern humans likely descended from the Heidelbergs, and the
paltry 200,000-year evolutionary timeline of Homo sapiens now
seems little more than icing on an evolutionary cake that had
been baking for several million years.
Social Cognition
One of the problems with archaeological models of a quarter
of a century ago was that the principal measuring rod for
human cognitive development was the so-called “tool kit,”
the technology of hand axes and points. And when one
considered the paltry development of the Acheulean tool kit
of Homo erectus (employed over the first 800,000 years of his
evolution), one might conclude that there was little cognitive
development over this timeframe. Such a deduction would have
been tenable but for one nagging fact: the cranial capacity
of Homo erectus was nearly double the size of his pre-Homo
predecessors. What evolutionary factors could possibly explain
why an organ (the brain), which consumes 20% of the body’s
metabolic output, would enlarge itself so disproportionally
and at such a high nutritional cost to the rest of the
body? Conventional evolutionary theory offered no satisfactory
explanation.
Only toward the end of the last century did a series of
hypotheses begin to be put forth. In studying the cognition of
great apes alongside the social development of human children,
the evolutionary anthropologist Michael Tomasello pointed out
that humans are unique to other primates in one important
regard, which is the extent of our social cognition. Early in
our evolutionary history, he argues, we initiated the process
of cumulative cultural evolution or the ability to take creative
inventions and pass them down to succeeding generations.
The reason that we were able to create this cultural “ratchet
effect” was because we developed one social skill that great
apes did not, which was the ability to see other members of
our species as intentional beings with mental lives similar to
our own (Tomasello, 1999, p. 5). This unique skill began to be
cultivated early in our evolution, around the start of the Homo
genus, but it greatly accelerated with the Heidelbergs, who likely
practice such social skills as pantomime, simple representation,
self-monitoring, inference, and a willingness to seek conformity
with others in social groups (Tomasello, 2014, p. 48–66). In
other words, just as we change the aspects of our cultural
context, so does our ever-changing cultures alter our cognitive
structures.
Also in the 1990s the evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar
put forth his “social brain hypothesis,” which proposed that
the cultural complexity of our ever expanding social networks
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(our families, friends, enemies, clans, and larger social alliances)
necessitated the expansion of our cognitive powers in order
to cope with this new social reality (Dunbar, 1998). Whereas,
the tenet of a correlation between big brains and the size
of social communities is generally accepted, there remains
much discussion about the cause—that is, of whether meta-
representational models such as mind-reading (theory of mind)
are needed to explain social cognition or whether cognitive
complexity might be more parsimoniously explained through
embodied and distributed processes of cognition built into our
perceptual activity (Barret et al., 2007).
Such challenges have been assisted by two other developments
of the 1990s: a more embodied understanding of emotion
and the discovery of mirror mechanisms. In the first regard
there was there were the pioneering efforts of Jaak Panksepp
and Antonio Damasio, both of whom viewed emotion less
as a psychological state of mind, the antithesis of logical
reasoning, and more as reason’s very biological foundation
(Damasio, 1994). Emotions are “affect” or electrical/chemical
programs that shape or shortcut the way in which we perceive
the world, basically as pleasurable or non-pleasurable events
(Panksepp, 1998). In its simplest definition, emotion is the
pre-reflective response of an organism to a stimulus, and
translated into architectural terms it can be described as the
pre-reflective response of the human organism to the built
environment. In this way architectural design, similar to human
cognition in general, is fundamentally emotional in its enactive
properties.
The discovery of mirror mechanisms in the early 1990s has
similarly provided new insights into how we perceptually engage
with the world. They were first discovered in macaque monkeys
in a lab at the University of Parma and within a few years
humans were also shown to possess such systems, although in
a more complex way (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). Mirror
mechanisms are sensorimotor circuits that fire not just when
we perform an action, but when we see or hear someone else
performing an action, such as playing the piano or lifting a tea
cup. Effectively, parts of our sensorimotor circuits respond as if
we were performing the action, excluding those motor circuits
by which we would actually perform the action. The process
has been called “embodied simulation” and it is the reason why
we enjoy watching an athlete or a ballet dancer (Gallese, 2005;
Gallese and Gattara, 2015).
Around the turn of this century the issue arose as to
whether mirror mechanisms might also explain how or why
we are so facile at reading or sharing the emotions of others—
that is, how in seeing a friend we know immediately her
state of mind, as if we share an empathic accord with her.
We now know that through neurological mechanisms we
internalize and simulate the emotions of others, although the
extent to which mirror mechanisms are learned is still being
debated today (see, for instance, Catmur et al., 2007). Human
empathy, it seems, possesses deep evolutionary, biochemical, and
neurological underpinnings, activating the cortical and limbic
areas, brainstem, autonomic nervous, and endocrine systems.
These mirror circuits at the same time underscore just how
basic empathy or sociality is to our human natures. We do not
become social simply through cultural training; we are born
social in the non-nativist sense that we come into the world with
the neural capacity to construct affordances through our social
engagement with the world. What has also emerged from this
research is a very tidy explanation of how we have distinguished
ourselves from our primate ancestors. We took the mirror
and other neural mechanisms already present in our primate
lineage and—over the course of a few million years—bridged the
cognitive, sensorimotor, and somato-visceral dimensions of our
evolution.
A Phenomenological Model for
Architectural Research
As the many implications of all of these events began to
become known around the turn of the present century, it is
quite understandable how and why philosophy itself underwent
a critical upheaval during the same period. We are, as the
phenomenologist Edmund Husserl noted many years ago,
“animate organisms” sensorialy and emotionally attuned to
our surroundings, yet the predominant interest of philosophy
throughout the twentieth century was its almost exclusive
focus on the rational aspects of our being. Cognition, within
philosophical literature in fact, has often been reduced to this
single capacity: the exercise of the Cartesian cogito. Theories
of embodiment first appeared as a way to correct this dualistic
bias, but only now are we realizing the full extent to which the
body actually shapes our thinking. We are also beginning to
see, as the philosopher Evan Thompson has recently noted, that
the nervous system, body, physical, and cultural environments
are dynamically integrated with each other on multiple levels,
and how, as a consequence, the developmental processes of
human life reconstruct themselves anew in each generation in
response to ever-changing genetic, cellular, social, and cultural
factors (Thompson, 2007). The brain, the body, and the
environment are in effect codetermining of each other and
therefore coevolving.
In a paper of 1998, “Radical embodiment: neural dynamics
and consciousness,” Thompson and Francisco Varela provided
a formula for considering these issues by noting that there
are three realms or dimensions of embodiment in higher
primates:
(1) cycles of organismic regulation of the entire body;
(2) cycles of sensorimotor coupling between organism and
environment;
(3) cycles of intersubjective interaction, involving the recognition of the
intentional meaning of actions and linguistic communication (in
humans).
(Thompson and Varela, 2001)
Whereas such a model was proposed for philosophical analysis,
it is a model that can be readily transposed into areas of research
relating to the practice of architecture:
(1) Human biology and the built environment (homeostatic
adjustments to the built environment);
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(2) Perceptual and aesthetic experience of the built environment (the
dynamics of sensorimotor coupling);
(3) Sociocultural nature of the built environment (intersubjective
interactions).
Human Biology and the Built Environment
The form andmuscular-skeletal characteristics of our bodies, our
nervous, and perceptual systems, and the many facets of our
affective and cognitive networks—all have evolved over the last
2.4 million years (limiting ourselves to the species Homo) largely
within natural terrains. This realm will consider the functioning
of the human organism within the built environment, our altered
terrains and present-day niches. Central to this description
are basic descriptions of the human nervous system, the
characteristics of its growth and development, the perceptual
systems by which we orient and navigate ourselves with respect
to our surroundings, and the impact of factors such as sensory
enrichment and deprivation on our health and happiness.
Perceptual and Aesthetic Experience of
the Built Environment
With this dimension of embodiment we can take some new and
bold initiatives, because neuroimaging technologies now allow
us to explore with considerable precision the human experience
of the built environment. For instance, we can now begin to
study human responses to variousmaterials (steel, glass, concrete,
wood), the dynamics of personal and peripersonal space, our
biological responses to certain spatial settings, human responses
to particular forms, colors, proportions, textures, light, and
vegetation—in short the many enactive variables that compose
the built environment. The goal here, it must be emphasized,
is not to prescribe guidelines or presume some kind of one-
size-fits-all design, but to underscore the intensity and wealth
of experiences that architecture can provide and present this
information as a challenge to the designer. When this research
is directed at larger urban scales, it will allow us to discuss in
an informed way how our cities might be conceived in a more
humane way.
Sociocultural Nature of the Built
Environment
It is at this level that we can introduce and expand upon current
research in social empathy and social neuroscience, and align
architectural theory with the premises of contemporary gene-
culture theory. How we do so should be debated, but again we
should stress that we are biological organisms with certain basic
needs. Architecture does not exist to coax human behavior (our
cities are filled with failed social experiments or “solutions” of
the past) but to let it unfold in a natural and dignified way,
attuned to our sociality. Architects have often invoked such
terms as “atmosphere” in relation to design—that is, how a
fireplace within a room, or a pleasant view into a plaza or
garden, informs the mood of those experiencing it. From a
sociocultural perspective, one might define architecture as the
psychological setting for a mood, or, in the words of van Eyck,
as the making of a “place” and “occasion” for social ceremonies
and aesthetic rituals. Many years ago Gottfried Semper referred
to the hearth as the “moral element” of architecture, and in his
cultural exposition of this theme he described the “sacred flame,”
later socially housed within the festival apparatus, as “the motive
for the permanent monument, which is intended to proclaim
to future generations the solemn act or event celebrated.” At
this point he inserted his well-known footnote on the “dressing
and the mask” and cautioned the architect not to “blurt out”
the theme of the artistic creation, but to mask it in an aesthetic
or playful way (Semper, 2005, p. 438–439). Similarly—if indeed
our human ancestors engaged in laughing, singing, and dancing
around a fire as early as one million years ago, we should
now recognize and respect ourselves for the singers, dancers,
and masked personas we really are. Only in this way will our
new knowledge of ourselves, far from being reductive, allow us
to explore and reclaim the multiple dimensions of our distant
humanity.
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